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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two millennia, present-day Turkey has held political, cultural, and
economic importance in world history. From the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires
to the modern Turkish republic, Anatolia and Thrace have been straddling the
Eastern and Western worlds and continue to have far-reaching importance in
Eurasia today. While knowledge of Turkey’s historical heritage is essential for an
understanding of its contemporary politics, this paper focuses on developments
since the founding of the Republic in 1923.
This paper argues that Turkey has emerged as a regional power in Eurasia
and that this emergence has implications for US-Turkish relations. Specifically, I
argue that the United States must strengthen its partnership with Turkey for the
benefit of American strategic interests in the region.
In part one, the paper examines factors that account for Turkey’s
emergence as a regional power and how that power is manifest. In doing so, the
purpose is to show that the factors presented in the literature are inadequate for
fully explaining Turkey’s emergence. For example, Turkey’s introduction of neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s under Turgut Ozal or its European Union
accession process starting in 1999 are often presented as developments that
exclusively enabled Turkey’s emergence. However, this paper reveals that a
multiplicity of developments, over several decades, worked to reinforce one
another and resulted in Turkey’s emergence as a regional power. In chapter two,
Turkey’s unique historical foundation is presented as a factor leading to its
emergence. The nation-building project under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk which
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focused on national unity, secularization, modernization, and westernization was
fundamental to laying the foundation for the emergence.
Chapter three analyzes the evolution of democracy in Turkey to better
elucidate contemporary internal dynamics. The process of democratization has in
many ways defined Turkish politics and society and is necessary for appreciating
Turkey as a Muslim majority democracy. Additionally, this chapter evaluates
whether Turkey’s democracy is replicable and can serve as a standard-bearer for
the nascent democracies of the Arab Spring. Chapter four examines economic and
political policies over the last three decades, in particular the introduction of neoliberal economic policies and a more assertive regional foreign policy that
induced internal modifications and enabled Turkey’s emergence. Chapter five
analyzes the political and economic effects of Turkey’s interaction with the
European Union, especially the EU accession process, which allowed Turkey to
assume a larger regional role.
With an understanding of Turkey’s emergence as a regional power, part
two analyzes the implications of Turkey’s new role for US-Turkish bilateral
relations and for American interests in Eurasia. The broader purpose of this
section is to show that Turkey is emblematic of a changing global political
system, in which certain states are accruing larger regional significance mitigating
the influence of larger powers like the United States. Chapter six gives an
overview of the history of US-Turkish relations to put contemporary
developments in historical context. This chapter also analyzes points of
contention between the United States and Turkey. Finally, chapter seven
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examines the changing power dynamics in Eurasia and their implications for
American influence in the region. Also, this chapter argues for a strengthening of
US-Turkey relations for mutually beneficial strategic interests.
The emergence of Turkey can be understood through the international
relations theory of constructivism which is “characterized by an emphasis on the
importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in
shaping political action.”1 In essence, constructivist theorists like Christian ReusSmit argue that “how actors define their ‘selves’ . . . informs their ‘interests’” and
actions.2 The notion that Turkey is an emergent power with enhanced influence in
the region is a perception insisted upon by the Turkish leadership. By
promulgating this self-conceived identity, Turkey is creating a space for itself in
the region as a regional power. I argue that the amplified economic and political
importance of Turkey justifies this self-conceived identity and that Turkey is an
emergent regional power. Furthermore, I see a growing recognition outside of the
region, specifically from the United States, of Turkey’s importance. Essentially,
US policymakers are increasing cognizant of Turkey’s significance for American
objectives in Eurasia, and I argue for strengthened bilateral relations to realize
both Turkish policy priorities and US interests in the region.

1

Reus-Smit, Christian. "Constructivism." Theories of International Relations. Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 212-35. Print.
2
Reus-Smit, 221.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS:
NATION-BUILDING UNDER MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATURK

INTRODUCTION
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were eventful times for present-day
Turkey. From the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence to the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were part of a pivotal point in history.
The establishment of the Republic of Turkey was yet another monumental event.
Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turks successfully waged
and won a war of independence and asserted their territorial integrity and national
sovereignty. While initially a fragmented group of ethnic and religious
communities, Ataturk succeeded in creating a cohesive nation-state that would
eventually assert its regional power. This chapter examines the vision of Ataturk
and the methods he used to establish a modern secular republic. The founding
principles of the Republic enabled Turkey’s emergence as a regional power.

THE IDEOLOGY OF ATATURK
The legend of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is burned in the national consciousness of
Turkey. Turks concur on his greatness and the notion that he alone deserves credit
for the creation and resilience of the modern Turkish republic. In the mystique
surrounding Ataturk, it is instructive to look at the guiding principles that
motivated his vision of a new Turkey. Also, it is equally important to highlight the
methods through which he facilitated the creation of the modern republic.
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The state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire during Ataturk’s formative
years shaped much of his ideology. As the “Sick Man of Europe” during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire spiraled
uncontrollably to dissolution.3 Internal and external forces facilitated and
precipitated this free-fall. Externally, world powers like Great Britain and France
exerted economic and political pressure on a weak and ineffective state to
apportion a part of the Empire after its predicted collapse. Internally, the
multitude of ethnic groups in the Empire began to resent centralized rule from
Istanbul and agitated for national sovereignty. As a result, Ataturk formulated an
ideology based on the desire to keep foreign powers out of Turkish domestic
affairs, and to create an undeniable Turkish national identity to unite disparate
people groups.
Furthermore, Ataturk’s view towards the social and religious culture
prevalent in much of the Ottoman Empire shaped his ideology. He sought to turn
away from the Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Ottoman heritage, and embrace a
European identity.4 Ataturk believed that “national progress would come by
emulating, absorbing and reproducing ‘European’ cultural values and political
institutions.”5 He greatly disliked the diffusion of Islam in political and social life
and was infatuated with all things European, both of which were evident in the
policies and programs he enforced. While Ataturk was not personally religious, he
saw the prominence of Islam as a sign of backwardness and a hindrance to the
3

Wilkens-Sozen, Erika. “The New Republic and Secularism.” Bahcesehir University, Istanbul. 26
Oct. 2011. Lecture.
4
Wilkens-Sozen, 19 Oct. 2011.
5
Haynes, Jeffrey. “Politics, identity, and religious nationalism in Turkey: from Ataturk to the
AKP.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64.3 (2010): 312-327.
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establishment of a modern secular state. Nevertheless, he recognized religion as a
“social force” useful as a tool if necessary to mobilize the polity but was quick to
discard it when it obstructed his plans of modernization.6 Ataturk’s clearest
position on religion came during his last address to the Turkish Parliament in
which he stated, “We take our inspiration from life, and not from books believed
to have come down from heaven.”7 This unambiguous reference to the Quran
reveals Ataturk’s secularist ideology. His desire for Turkish progress led to
decades of modernization through westernization.

THE CREATION OF A NATION
The establishment of the modern Turkish republic was a formidable task.
Ataturk’s legacy lives because he faced and overcame a Herculean challenge.
After the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence, the Turkish
people, landscape, infrastructure, and economy were decimated. Ataturk had to
unite illiterate peasants and refugees into a nation strong enough to repel the
“imposition of empires and nation-states with far greater resources and more
knowledge about modernity.”8 In essence, Ataturk had the task of
institutionalizing new social and political norms that enabled the establishment of
a resilient state.
In this context, Ataturk conducted his mission of progress through
secularization and modernization in undemocratic ways. Through a one-party

6

Mango, Andrew. “Ataturk: Founding Father, Realist, and Visionary.” Political Leaders and
Democracy in Turkey. Ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari. Lexington Books, 2002. 9-24. Print.
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system, the Republic People’s Party (CHP), Ataturk enacted programs and
policies intended to change the society drastically and consolidate the nation.
While Ataturk used authoritarian methods to reach his objectives, he believed that
“unless a modern, secular, and national culture [was] established, a modern
political system, potentially hosting some form of democracy could not survive.”9
The Tanzimat Reforms of the mid-nineteenth century had sought to modernize
quickly in order to keep pace with rising European powers. One element of the
Tanzimat Reforms was an attempt to limit the authority of the religious
establishment in Ottoman legal procedures.10 Given Ataturk’s aversion to religion
in the public sphere, his policies went further to marginalize the religious
establishment. First, he attacked the traditional strongholds of institutionalized
Islam including abolishing the Caliphate in 1924, secularizing family law in 1926,
removing a constitutional clause making Islam the state religion of Turkey, and
removing religious education from traditional bodies.11 In effect, Ataturk sought
to limit the presence of religion from the public sphere to the private lives of
citizens. Second, religious symbols were replaced with symbols of European
civilization including a ban on the turban and fez in favor of western style hats.12
Third, he sought to secularize social life, essentially an attack on popular Islam,
including the adoption of western clock and calendar, the Latin alphabet, and

9

Kalaycioglu, Ersin. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005. Print.
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greater political rights for women consisting of suffrage and the right to stand for
elections.13
As Erika Wilkens-Sozen notes, in the midst of these reforms came an
effort to create a Turkish “national history” to build a cohesive national identity.14
In 1927, Ataturk gave a thirty-six hour speech over the course of six days in
which he retold the nation’s history from 1919 until 1927 in order to fit the
narrative of an Independence struggle and the endeavor to create a new
Republic.15 Part of this narrative emphasized a Turkish and Anatolian heritage as
separate from the Middle Eastern and Islamic civilization of the Ottoman
Empire.16
These aggressive reforms were not enacted without opposition. The new
Republic’s biggest challenge came from ethnic and religious communities that
still desired the reestablishment of an Ottoman system.17 The rebellion of Sheik
Said, an influential Kurdish religious leader, exemplified this opposition. After
the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Sheik Said led a rebellion motivated by a
desire for an autonomous or independent Kurdistan and also a Muslim uprising
against the secular ruling party.18 The government in Ankara reacted swiftly and
forcefully by sending an army to quell rebel forces, executing many leaders,
resettling 20,000 Kurds from southeastern to western Turkey, and denying the

13
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existence of a ‘Kurdish identity’.19 Additionally, the government passed the Law
on the Maintenance of Order, which outlawed any institution or organization that
might cause disturbance to law and order.20 As was true with the Sheik Said
rebellion, the armed forces were, and are still, utilized for promulgating the
government’s secularist agenda. During the Ottoman period, the armed forces
were the first group to be modernized along western lines and have functioned as
natural defenders of modernization and secularization in the name of progress.21

CONCLUSION
Though the early years of the Republic were volatile and combative, the
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was vital to the consolidation of political
authority and national unity. Through extensive secularization of politics, society
and the legal system, Ataturk enabled the creation of the modern democratic
Turkish state. However, while Ataturk highlighted the desire to be modern like
the West, he used one-party autocratic rule to administer his programs and
policies. He also disallowed opposition parties, used the state’s coercive power to
purge opposition leaders, and even executed citizens who violated laws
concerning the turban and fez.22 Evidently, Ataturk was a leader more committed
to modernization than to liberal democracy.23 However, Ataturk remained
cognizant of the disparities between his rhetoric and his actions, and justified

19
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them by emphasizing the need for Turkey to reform drastically.24 In many ways,
Ataturk established the institutions of democracy but left them dormant during his
rule.25 In the 1930s he allowed some opposition parties to form and be active in
order to foster public discourse. Most importantly, Ataturk’s insistence on
secularization enabled the eventual development of a resilient democracy in a
Muslim-majority state, a feat yet to be emulated. Ataturk’s lasting legacy can best
be described in his own words: “I have established the republic. But today it is not
clear whether the form of government is a republic, a dictatorship, or personal
rule. I am mortal. I want the nation to get used to freedom before I die.”26 In
promoting new norms of secularization and modernization, Ataturk never lost
sight of the need for freedom in order for a society to progress. The political,
economic, and social strength of Turkey today can be attributed to the vision and
conviction of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the nation he built.

24

Mango, 7.
Mango, 21.
26
Mango, 21.
25

11

CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY:
A MODEL MUSLIM DEMOCRACY?

INTRODUCTION
To understand the internal dynamics of Turkish politics and the nation’s broader
regional importance, requires knowledge of the historical challenges of
democratic consolidation in Turkey. From the inception of the Republic until
today, Turkey underwent periods of one-party, authoritarian, military, and semidemocratic rule. While sometimes overlapping and duplicating periods, each was
formative in the development of Turkish democratic governance. Important
features through all of these periods have been the Kemalist desire to secularize in
pursuit of westernization and the active role of the military in civilian affairs.
Anne Secor argues that the current ruling party, the Justice and Development
Party (AKP), has reconfigured the fault lines of democracy in Turkey and
prompted the question of whether Islamist rulers can govern in a secular
democratic framework.27 This question takes on greater meaning with the process
of democratization sweeping the Arab world today. To examine the notion that
Turkey can serve as a model Muslim democracy, this chapter analyzes the
composition of Turkish democracy and speculates as to whether it is replicable.
Turkey’s ability to incorporate moderate Islamist parties into a semi-democratic
system has legitimized Turkey in western eyes and given greater credence to its
position as a regional power.

27

Secor, Anna. "Turkey's Democracy: A Model for the Troubled Middle East?" Eurasian
Geography and Economics 52.2 (2011): 157-172.
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THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY
In addition to free and fair elections, principles associated with democracy are
freedom of speech, equal protection of minorities, and limiting the “tutelary”28
rights of the unelected. Throughout the republican period, Turkey has been
challenged on all of these fronts in its effort to consolidate democracy.
Authoritarianism began under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Republican
People’s Party (CHP). From the creation of the nation in 1923 until the first free
and fair multi-party elections in 1950, the CHP used its unrestrained mandate to
secularize and to westernize the young republic. Underlying its efforts was the
notion that “removal of Islam from political discourse was fundamental to the
making of the modern nation-state.”29 The tensions between religion and politics
that plagued the Ottoman Empire dominated the early years of the republic. Anne
Secor characterizes the Kemalist project as an aggressive approach towards
religion, termed laicism, which was not simply “freedom of or from religion” but
instead government control of religion.30 The goal of subverting religion under
government control was to moderate the pervasive influence it could potentially
wield in the public sphere. As a result, article 136 of the Turkish constitution
established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, tasked with “administration of
mosques and the training of religious personnel.”31 In addition to the Directorate,
the Turkish state would utilize the military and constitutional courts as institutions
of secularization.
28

Sozen, Yunus. "Turkey between Tutelary Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism."
Quarterly International Review 13 (2008).
29
Secor, 158.
30
Secor, 159.
31
Secor, 159.
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While founded on the undemocratic single-party governance of the CHP,
Turkey would eventually make its first transition to electoral democracy in 1950,
with the Democratic Party (DP) taking the mantle of government. From 1950 to
1983, Turkey’s efforts at democratization were thwarted by political instability,
civil unrest, and military intervention. In 1960, 1971, and 1980, the military
intervened to displace elected governments, fulfilling its role as a secularist
modernizing institution with the task of maintaining political and social order. As
a dominant presence in civilian affairs, the military has an interesting, albeit
undemocratic role, as stipulated in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service
Law which gives it “wide room for maneuver to intervene into politics” and has
“budgetary autonomy which is not entirely under the control of elected
civilians.”32 Lauren McLaren argues that the paradoxical function of the military
as the defender of secularism while undermining elected governments poses one
of the greatest challenges to Turkish democratization.33 Similarly, from 1971 to
2001 the constitutional courts banned political parties deemed to be violating the
nation’s secularist principles. Most recently, on February 28, 1997, the courts and
military collaborated to remove the Refah (Welfare) Party after elections that put
it in control of a coalition government.34 The now infamous “February 28th
process” illustrated the authority held by the military and courts, which McLaren

32

McLaren, Lauren. "The Failure of Democracy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis."
Government and Opposition 46.4 (2011): 485-516.
33
McLaren, 450.
34
Secor, 160.
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considers “the high-water mark of secularist backlash against the Islamicization of
the Turkish public sphere.”35
Since the military intervention of 1980 and the subsequent rewriting of the
nation’s constitution, there has been greater progress towards Turkish
democratization. However, democracy has yet to be consolidated in Turkey. The
“tutelary”36 powers historically granted to the military are not entirely repudiated
by the majority of the population. Many Turks still consider the military and
courts as protectors of the Kemalist secularist project. In effect, while the military
was vital for stabilizing the government during its interventions, “elites and
masses alike can envision alternatives to democratic rule and these are not
perceived as terrible enough to force them into democratic compromises.”37 To
become a “fully functioning democracy”,38 Turkey needs to agree on how the
regime will function. In essence, issues such as the role of religion, rights of
religious groups, and the treatment of ethnic minorities need to be resolved so
there are established “rules of the regime” to enable democratic consolidation.39

DEMOCRACY UNDER THE AKP
Since taking power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has
changed the nation’s political landscape and reconfigured the essence of
democracy in Turkey. The meteoric rise and sustained success of the AKP has
been of special interest to observers of Eurasian politics. Under its dominant
35

Secor, 160
Sozen.
37
McLaren, 502.
38
McLaren 488.
39
McLaren 514.

36
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leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP has solidified its hold on
domestic politics and has overseen the economic and political emergence of a
regionally influential Turkey. Ideologically, AKP members self-identify as
conservatives or Muslim-democrats. While recognizing the importance of Islam
for the party, the AKP is careful to distance itself from characterizations of party
members as Islamists who want to undermine the secularism of the state with
Islamic principles. Criticism of the AKP’s ideology rests on the notion that the
party is “bent on the Islamization of Turkish society and the Turkish state.”40 The
secularist establishment fears that the AKP is hiding its Islamic agenda in order
not to be condemned by the constitutional courts, a practice referred to as
“takiyye.”41
The bourgeoning popularity of the AKP can be attributed not only to its
ideological leanings, but also to its success in producing economic results and
effective public administration. The AKP initially gained its national reputation as
the party of results, with effective management of municipal public services
nation-wide. Economically, the AKP “carried out a successful privatization
program and encouraged foreign investment, which has risen twentyfold” since
2002.42 These successes in addition to the AKP’s ideology have resulted in a
constituency of supporters able to continue reelecting the AKP. According to
Ihsan Dagi, this broad-based constituency includes the pro-market devout

40
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bourgeoisie, the urban and rural poor, and the unemployed, a plurality of the
electorate that sustain the AKP’s electoral success.43
Since coming to power, the AKP faced the difficult challenge of balancing
EU accession reforms aimed at further democratizing Turkey with a hostile
secular establishment that includes the influential military. The AKP’s objective
has been to establish “new rules of the game and a more democratic definition of
the civil-military equation in Turkey, where a politically autonomous and secular
military is pitted against a popularly elected Islamic government in the context of
an electoral democracy.”44 To this end, the AKP has made many changes,
including reducing the role of the military in civilian affairs, “liberalizing laws
regarding Kurdish language broadcasting and use, and generally bringing Turkey
further in line with Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU.”45 One major
effort towards democratization was a September 2010 referendum with 26
constitutional amendments partially aimed at changing the structure of
administrative courts and lessening the role of the military. The passage of the
referendum served to vindicate the AKP and showed popular support for the
party’s modernizing efforts, regardless of staunch opposition from the secular
establishment.
Such progressive moves by the AKP have been undermined by other
instances of undemocratic practices. Most notably, the 2007 Ergenekon affair was
an example of the AKP displaying authoritarian tendencies. The affair involved

43
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an investigation of a supposed coup conspiracy involving the Turkish ‘deep state’
composed of “networks between military, intelligence agents, organized crime,
right-wing paramilitaries, leftist intellectuals, the PKK, and seemingly all manner
of anti-AKP elements.”46 The investigation resulted in draconian measures by the
AKP to combat the supposed threat in which “nearly 200 journalists, scholars,
military personnel, business leaders, and politicians have been
arrested.”47Western governments viewed the heavy-handed response negatively as
a blatant suppression of free speech. Even more, the “crackdown has been
perceived as a pretext to purge ideological opponents across the political spectrum
and thereby to consolidate AKP hegemony.”48
Under the AKP, democratization in Turkey continues to be problematic.
While the party has shown potential, especially with EU-induced reforms aimed
at greater democracy, the Ergenekon investigations and prosecutions are an
alarming indicator of centralized and undemocratic AKP control. Though the
AKP maintains its dedication to progressive reforms, critics claim that “its
commitment to diversity and freedom of expression is very narrowly wrought and
seems not to move much beyond a commitment to the freedom of Islamic
expression within the secular state.”49 In essence, the AKP appears to be more
focused on expanding the visibility of Islam in the public sphere rather than on
genuine efforts at democratization. The prospects for consolidated democracy in
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Turkey under the AKP will depend on the ability of EU reforms to institute
democratic institutions and practices.

TURKEY AS A MODEL MUSLIM DEMOCRACY?
In the past year a wave of democratization has swept the Arab world. This “Arab
Spring” has substantially improved prospects for real democracy in the region.
The fall of authoritarian regimes brought elections in Tunisia and Egypt, and
forthcoming elections in Libya. In just one year, the region has gone from a
bastion of electoral authoritarianism to a region largely unfriendly to despotic
rule. Given these developments, Turkey has frequently been considered as a
possible model for these infant democracies, as Turkey is the only Muslimmajority nation with experience as a democratic nation, however flawed.
A major difficulty in using Turkey as a model is the dissimilarity of the
historical development of democracy in Turkey vis-à-vis the Arab Spring nations.
The contemporary political order in Turkey is the result of a “long process of
staggered progress towards democratization”50 which is still developing. After
decades of democratizing, some aspects of Turkish politics have stalled
democracy. Factors such as the government’s inability to accommodate organized
labor, limitations on speech, and continued discrimination against ethnic and
religious minorities are all blights on Turkey’s democratic record.51
In democratizing nations like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, their recent
political experience has been characterized by electoral authoritarianism in which
50
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the ruling regime maintained authoritarian institutions and practices while
instituting some semblance of democracy via elections.52 In essence, these states
are devoid of many of the social and political infrastructures necessary for the
establishment of a lasting democracy. Also, the role of Islam in political discourse
will be important for the viability of democracy in the Arab world. It will be
interesting to see the extent to which secularist principles are adhered to that
enable freedom for and from religion. Therefore, using Turkey as a model raises
the question of whether it has “successfully incorporated political Islam into a
secular state structure, and can therefore be a model of secular democracy for
Muslim-majority states?”53 While lessons can be drawn from the evolution of
democratization in Turkey, applying that model to the very different conditions in
the Arab world would yield unpredictable outcomes.54 In its process of
democratization, Turkey has attempted to create a state that resembles the western
notion of democracy. The Arab Spring nations do not share this western identity
and may desire a form of democracy unlike the Turkish model. While Turkey can
be instructive in some respects, it should not be considered a standard-bearer for
the democratizing Arab Spring nations.

CONCLUSION
Democratization in Turkey has been a long and protracted process which is
continuously evolving. Understanding Turkey’s troubled democratic pedigree is

52
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essential for a more nuanced appreciation of its contemporary political condition.
While democracy has improved, concerns remain about the extent to which the
military influences civilian affairs and government policies on personal liberty
and minority rights. Even with its numerous problems, Turkey can be instructive
for the emerging democracies across the Arab world in showing one way to
incorporate moderate Islam into a democratic political system. Nevertheless,
Turkey’s unique historical development makes it unfit as a replicable model for
these emerging democracies.

21

CHAPTER 4
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TURKEY’S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
STRENGTH

INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, Turkey has applied economic and political policies to
enable its emergence as a regional power. Economically, the transition from
import-substitution to neo-liberalism illustrated Turkey’s desire to modernize and
integrate into the global economy. While there have been some structural
difficulties, Turkey’s economic liberalization ultimately resulted in a stronger
domestic market and greater trade cooperation with regional neighbors.
Politically, the post-Cold War era has witnessed the materialization of a more
assertive Turkish foreign policy and greater recognition by the international
community that Turkey is a formidable player in Eurasian affairs. These
occurrences were enabled by Turkey’s inclusion in the ‘West’ during the bi-polar
Cold War era and of that legitimization resulting in its pivotal regional role. These
economic and political developments encountered considerable challenges, but
have undoubtedly been a large part of Turkey’s emergence as a regional power.

ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN TURKEY
The state of Turkey’s economy over the last three decades can be characterized as
sporadic, with periods of growth and success, a subsequent period of painful
structural failing, and, most recently, with reserved optimism for the future.
According to Ziya Onis, this changeability takes root in Turkey’s transition from
an import-substitution to a neo-liberal economic model beginning in the early
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1980s.55 Prior to this changeover, Turkey’s economy was defined by its efforts to
protect and strengthen domestic industries through high tariffs and a generally
favorable economic climate. Through protection of infant industries, Turkey
desired to develop a market that would be competitive on the global stage.
However, as Onis argues, Turkey’s shift to a neo-liberal model was not “from
voluntary choice but as an inevitable and forced outcome of a major balance of
payments crisis associated with the exhaustion of the import-substitution model of
industrialization.”56 The end of this model was also due to the realization that
Turkey would remain a peripheral nation in the global economic market, which
was antithetical to the ambitious desires of political leaders.
Onis credits the liberalization of Turkey’s economy to the leadership of
Turgut Ozal.57 After Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ozal is widely considered the most
influential political leader in the history of the modern republic. Similar to
Ataturk, Ozal had a dogged determination to make transformative changes to
Turkey, sometimes using undemocratic methods with certain negative results but
ultimately for the betterment of Turkey. As Prime Minister from 1983 until 1989
and President from 1989 until 1993, Ozal provided a consistency in leadership
that facilitated the realization of his objectives.58 Also, his unique and diverse
experiences before political life helped in the formulation of his neo-liberal
ideology and his ability to institute reform. Ozal’s service in the public sector with
the Agency for Study of Electrical Energy and as Under-Secretary of the State
55
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Planning Organization, the private sector with the Sabanci Corporation, and with
the World Bank, equipped him with the necessary knowledge, connections, and
capabilities to effectively liberalize the Turkish economy.59
Ozal’s neo-liberal policies aimed at opening Turkey’s economy to global
forces with the goals of strengthening domestic industries and allowing the inflow
of foreign investment. This liberalizing effort was encouraged and enabled by the
“IMF and World Bank as the providers of massive financial support…due to
Turkey’s geo-strategic importance.”60 Additionally, Turkey’s Customs Union
with the European Economic Community became a “crucial element in the fullscale liberalization” of the economy in the 1990s.61 In his role as a reformist
politician, Ozal was charismatic and created a “mood of optimism whereby
Turkish businessmen felt confident in their ability to penetrate distant markets.”62
A minor indicator of Ozal’s success was that compared to the 1990s, average
growth was higher and average inflation was lower through the course of the
1980s.63
However, through his leadership, Ozal showed ambivalence to democratic
economic institutions and undermined what he saw as inefficient bureaucracies.
The institutionalization of Ozal’s “reform process in Turkey was associated with a
weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus with costly consequences.”64 With the
objective of swift and unimpeded reform, it would have been difficult for Ozal to
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reach those goals within the existing economic structure.65 For example, after
1986, “key decisions on privatization of state economic enterprises” were
established top-down instead of utilizing the existing economic structure.66 The
lack of a developed economic structure for facilitating neo-liberal policies would
result in disastrous effects, evidenced by the economic crises that occurred in
1994, 2000 and 2001.67 Nevertheless, during and after those crises Turkey sought
to establish “strong regulatory institutions needed for effective implementation of
neo-liberal programs in areas like privatization and banking sector reform.”68
Since 1999, “IMF and EU discipline have helped Turkey institutionalize
reforms and have greater fiscal discipline.”69 Subsequent reforms, especially
under the AKP administration, enabled the emergence of Turkey as a regional and
global economic power with great potential. In essence, the legacy of Ozal’s
reforms realized that his “vision and influence was important in helping to
transform a self-enclosed society, with a mediocre image of itself, to an outward
and forward looking society that aimed to participate and play an active role in the
key regions surrounding Turkey.”70 Parallel to this economic bourgeoning would
be more aggressive political policies which collectively serve to illustrate
Turkey’s regional ascendancy.
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THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY’S POLITICAL POWER
Since the creation of the modern republic in 1923, Turkey has had geopolitical
importance because it is situated at the heart of Eurasia. Strategist Zbigniew
Brzezinski characterized Eurasia as a “grand chessboard”, equating control of the
region to global preeminence and Turkey has realized its potential for becoming a
pivotal player in regional affairs.71The foundations of this political emergence
have been laid since the Cold War era. As part of the western camp in the bi-polar
Cold War international political system, Turkey gradually gained political
legitimacy with its allies in Europe and with the United States. Also, as a vital
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, Turkey
has resoundingly proven its geo-political importance, potentially as the key to the
grand chessboard’.
The post-Cold War era has witnessed drastic realignments in the
international political system, resulting in a unipolar world of United States
hegemony. While no longer under the American Cold War umbrella, Turkey has
undertaken more independent policies in the region, asserting its political strength
while maintaining its relations with Cold War allies. Beginning in the 1990s,
Turkey sought rapprochement, in the form of stronger political and economic ties,
with Middle East states, Russia, former Soviet states and Greece. For example,
when Bashir al-Assad came to power in Syria in the early 2000s, there was a “free
trade agreement further integrating the economies of avid adversaries of the
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1990s.”72 Similarly, there was a “substantial increase in economic
interdependence” between Turkey and its neighbor Georgia, involving the usage
of the “Batum airport” and “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project.”73
More recently, the current ruling government under the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) has pursued foreign policy objectives that are
sometimes counter to the policies of the ‘West’, especially the United States.
Most notably, in dealing with Israel, Iran, and the Iraq War, Turkey has
undertaken policies to emphasize its “self-confidence” and desire to “carve out an
independent sphere of influence.”74 Despite disapproval of American policymakers, Turkey has deepened its ties with Iran, a neighbor with whom it shares a
310-mile border.75 Even more disturbing for the United States, was Turkey’s
disapproval of American troops using Turkish territory in the 2003 invasion of
Iraq.76 Furthermore, Turkey has drastically altered its relations with former
regional partner Israel, as it has “veered from its strong economic and military ties
with the Jewish state to firmly backing Palestinian independence.”77 This shift in
AKP policy cannot be underestimated, as Turkey has historically been a major
partner for Israel in a hostile region. These policy changes are indicative of a
transformation in Turkey’s self-identity. As the AKP government embraces
Turkey’s Islamic identity, there are changing perceptions of interests which has a
resultant effect on actions. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and increasing
72
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support for the Palestinian cause signify an evolution in its self- identity resulting
in closer alignment with its Muslim neighbors.
According to Saul Cohen, the AKP’s foreign policy emphasizes regional
cooperation and “zero problems”78 with its neighbors. Through effective use of
soft power, Turkey seeks a role as a “benign regional power” with the
responsibility of mediating regional conflicts.79 For example, Turkey hosted
diplomatic meetings between Pakistani and Afghan Presidents Musharraf and
Karzai in 2007 as well as between Israeli and Palestinian leaders Peres and Abbas
in 2008.80 Outside of the region, there is growing recognition of Turkey’s
burgeoning influence, epitomized by the United Nations request that Turkey take
a leadership role in the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative.81 The Initiative is
intended to “overcome prejudice, misconceptions, misperceptions, and
polarization which potentially threaten world peace”82 and Turkey’s inclusion in
the leadership of the Initiative is significant in showing the growing global
perception of Turkey as an influential state.
Turkey’s relationship with the Arab League is indicative of its growing
political influence. While not an Arab country, Turkey has benefited from its
participation “in almost every crucial summit held by the 22-country
organization.”83 Over the last several decades, “with the absence of an Arab
‘national heroic figure’ such as Egypt’s former President, Gamal Abdel Nasser,”
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the Arab world has suffered a power vacuum which is being filled by the
charismatic Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.84 Recently, Turkey
worked with the Arab League to resolve the crisis in Syria and took an aggressive
stance aimed at removing President Bashar al-Assad from power.85 That effort is
emblematic of Turkey’s determination to engage with its neighbors which Inan
Ozyildiz asserts is a transition “toward a new coordinated regional system based
on a combination of political and moral factors.”86 This engagement has been
reciprocated as Turkey is enthusiastically accepted by members of the Arab
League. Mohamad Chatah argues that there is growing recognition that Turkey
can play a role in “encouraging reforms, and building stability and peace in the
region.”87 There are great prospects for Turkey to continue utilizing its enhanced
regional influence. Bahgat Korany boldly predicts that by 2050, Turkey will
“have a first-class army, be more powerful than Germany, and rank as the world’s
ninth most powerful state.”88 While this prediction is hyperbolic, it effectively
shows Turkey’s potential for realizing its new position in the region.

CONCLUSION
The convergence of Turkey’s economic liberalization and political assertiveness
has enabled the emergence of Turkey as a regional power. While these economic
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and political explanations do not wholly explain why Turkey is now a pivotal
actor in Eurasia, they are a substantial part of a layered progression that has led to
this state of affairs.
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CHAPTER 5
THE TRANFORMATIVE EFFECTS OF TURKEY’S INTERACTION
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s interaction with the European Union (EU) has transformed its internal
development and enabled its emergence as a regional power. This phenomenon is
exemplified by Turkey’s ever-tightening relations with the European Union,
especially with the accession process that has been underway over the last decade.
The accession process precipitated political reforms, most notably efforts at
further democratization involving lessening the role of the military in civilian
affairs and enhancements of minority rights. According to Dimitar Bechev, these
reforms increased Turkey’s legitimacy, shown it as a model nation, and bolstered
its role as a leading regional player.89 Additionally, interaction with the European
Union has resulted in internal economic developments allowing greater foreign
penetration and the improvement of Turkey’s economic standing.

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL REFORMS
Throughout Turkey’s Republican history, a recurring theme is the need to
westernize in pursuit of national progress. This westernization has frequently
involved turning towards Europe and pursing political and economic engagement.
Turkey’s desire for membership in the European Union is emblematic of this
national objective. Since the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member in
1999, Turkey has undergone extensive changes in order to realize the goal of EU
89
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membership. Central to the modifications within Turkey has been the objective of
fulfilling the EU Copenhagen criteria which emphasize the establishment of
democratic institutions and a capable market economy.90 Also, accession
negotiations since 2005 required further reforms to prepare Turkey for EU
admission.91 Turkey’s eagerness for inclusion in the European Union was
evidenced by a rush of nine harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and
2004.92 These efforts at further democratization involved provisions for greater
free speech and association, new criminal and civil codes, eradication of the death
penalty, and “legal changes to facilitate the prosecution of public officials
responsible for torture and maltreatment of prisoners.”93 Turkey’s commitment to
Europeanization was shown in its readiness to modify quickly and the extent to
which reforms fundamentally changed the fabric of the nation. Additionally, the
reforms were undertaken by a multiplicity of political parties and disparate
segments of society, making it a true “national project.”94
At the behest of the European Union, these reforms addressed the balance
of civilian-military relations. As an institution designed to maintain the secular
purity of the Turkish state, the armed forces have historically asserted a
disproportionate control over civilian affairs. This influence was epitomized in the
National Security Council (NSC), a body involving the General Staff, members of
90
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the armed forces and cabinet ministers, whose recommendations were given
priority by the cabinet, even though it was established after the 1960 coup to
function as an advisory committee.95 With the amendment of Article 118 of the
constitution in 2001, there was an increase in the number of civilian members of
the NSC and restrictions which limited it to only advising the cabinet.96 While
there is still some debate as to whether the influence of the armed forces has truly
been restrained, the effort to make institutional changes to increase
democratization with an eye toward EU inclusion is greatly significant.
Additionally, the Kurdish Question continues to be a stumbling block to
Turkey’s acceptance in the European Union. A Kurdish minority seeks to protect
its national identity, while the government narrative has portrayed the issue as a
problem of economic underdevelopment in the region primarily inhabited by the
Kurds and of insurgent violence by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). In the
European Union, the Kurdish Question is perceived as a blight on the minority
and human rights record of Turkey. However, Turkey faces the challenge of
combating security threats posed by the PKK on its southeastern border while
allowing the existence of a vibrant Kurdish identity along with a Turkish identity.
To this end, beginning in 2009 the Turkish government undertook a campaign to
liberalize laws concerning Kurds, allowing use of the Kurdish language and
curtailing the government-sponsored village guard system, a program which used
local Kurdish militia to crack down on unfavorable activity in the southeastern
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territories.97 Furthermore, with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in
1999 and a supposed lessening of rebellious PKK activity, the Turkish
government was in a better position to extend greater liberties to the Kurdish
population. Supporting this initiative was Ocalan’s repudiation of violence and
“his advocacy of greater democracy and pluralism as a panacea to the Kurdish
problem” which “coincided with the new government’s aim to develop a more
liberal democracy and improve Turkey’s human rights record.”98
While democratizing in pursuit of EU admission, Kemal Kirisci has
characterized Turkey’s recent foreign policy as “proactive engagement in the
neighboring region.”99 With an ideology that emphasizes friendly relations with
all neighbors, the current ruling party has improved relations with nations
spanning from Iran and Russia to Egypt and Jordan. For example, Turkey’s
willingness to sign a free trade agreement with Syria in 2004, a country it “almost
went to war with in the 1990s,” reflects reoriented foreign policy objectives.100
Using Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” approach, Turkey seeks to
claim “a place in the new pecking order of emergent powers.”101 Assisting this
objective has been the increased democratization in Turkey that has come as a
result of greater Europeanization. Turkey has seemingly become more appealing
for regional nations and Saul Cohen argues that “most American foreign policy
analysts view Turkey as . . . a forward point for NATO and the West to the
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Middle East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia.”102 In essence, Turkey’s
unique hybrid identity has enabled it to function as a bridge between the East and
West.

THE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
While political interaction with the European Union has yielded noteworthy
change within Turkey, Kamil Yilmaz argues that great transformations have also
resulted from closer economic integration with Europe. The beginnings of
economic integration took root in the 1963 Ankara Agreement between Turkey
and the European Community (EC). Instead of receiving full EC membership,
Turkey was granted special economic privileges. The Customs Union (CU) of
1996 between Turkey and the European Union improved the Turkish economic
situation. As the final phase of the Ankara Agreement, the CU allows Turkey to
further integrate economically with the EU “without undertaking serious political
and institutional reforms, viewed as a precondition for full membership.”103
Yilmaz notes that an important element of this economic integration is the notion
of reciprocity of tariffs.104 In the first two phases of the Ankara Agreement, the
EU eradicated tariffs on Turkish goods, and in the CU Turkey reciprocated by
eliminating tariffs on EU goods as well as levying “the common external tariffs
on the EU against third countries.”105
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Additionally, the CU mandated that Turkey’s economic competition
practices be brought in line with the EU’s. In effect, the CU “changed the Turkish
trade policy framework completely by bringing in predictability, transparency,
and stability”106 for the overall benefit of the Turkish economy. Following the CU
and greater foreign penetration in Turkish markets, overall imports between 1995
and 2000 soared from $35.7 billion to $54.5 billion.107 Over this same time
period, imports from the EU also increased from $23.5 billion to $28.5 billion,
highlighting the extent to which the EU dominated Turkey’s trade relations.108
Nevertheless, the Turkish domestic market has remained strong, as Yilmaz notes
“the transformations of Turkish industry following the CU helped it to prepare
itself for even more formidable competitors such as China and other East Asian
countries.”109 While some sectors, like textiles and chemical products, were
initially negatively affected, the overall state of the Turkish economy has
strengthened as a result of its integration with the European Union.110
Over the last decade, Turkey’s economy has been an exemplary success.
The restructuring of Turkey’s economic institutions over the last two decades,
demonstrated by a growth rate of 7.4% from 2002-2007 facilitated this
achievement.111 However, Turkey was not immune to the global economic crisis
of 2008-2009 and suffered a slight setback. In 2009, Turkey’s GDP decreased by
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4.7% and unemployment rose from 8.8% to 12.5%.112 Nevertheless, the Turkish
economy showed great resilience and by the second quarter of 2010 GDP
increased by 10.3%.113 Presently, Turkey is a leading emerging market economy
along with Brazil, India, South Africa, and South Korea.114 Turkey is the 15th
largest economy in the world with a GDP of $1.1 trillion, a growth rate of 8.9%,
foreign direct investment of $25 billion in 2011, with expectations that exports
will reach $200 billion by 2013.115 Furthermore, Turkey is noteworthy for its
tourism industry with revenues of $25 billion in 2011 and has one of the leading
construction industries in the world.116
Additionally, Turkey is a member of the G20, a collection of twenty states
comprised of the world’s biggest economies and other relevant regional
powers.117 In addition to the global economy, the G20 deals with issues involving
health, education, the environment, and conflict resolution.118 As a member of the
G20, Turkey enjoys greater prestige and the opportunity to enhance its political
and economic strength. These changes over the last three decades signify
modifications in Turkey’s economic identity. As a free market economy with the
benefits of G20 membership, Turkey is enabled to assert its position in the region
as an important political and economic player.
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CONCLUSION
Decades of economic interaction and more recent political relations with the
European Union have been factors in enabling the emergence of Turkey as a
regional power. The provisions of the Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union,
and Copenhagen economic and political requirements have functioned to increase
economic interdependency between Turkey and the European Union. According
to Yilmaz, Turkey’s internal markets have been strengthened enough to deter
competitive pressures from East Asia and assert its own agenda regionally and
even internationally.119 Politically, Turkey has made wholesale changes via
constitutional amendments and other institutional reforms to further democratize
and extend civil and minority rights. This increased democratization, coerced by
the EU, enhanced the legitimacy and strength of Turkey in Eurasia.
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CHAPTER 6
A CONCISE HISTORY OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and the
Republic of Turkey, relations have been based not only on a military, political,
and economic alliance but also shared interests and common identities as secular
democracies. Through World War II and the Cold War, Turkey and the United
States converged on security and policy interests resulting in increasingly
tightened bilateral relations. Challenges to the relationship surfaced in the 1960s
and 1970s but were overcome and made way for cooperation in the 1980s and
1990s. In the post-Cold War era, with a less hostile international environment, the
motive for a continued strategic partnership has been up for speculation. This
notion has been precipitated by increasingly strained relations as Turkey looks to
assert its influence outside of the umbrella of American hegemony. A shift in
Turkey’s self-identity over the last decade has contributed to the tense relations.
Some sources of tension include Turkey’s relations with Iran and Israel and the
US War in Iraq. This chapter puts US-Turkish relations in historical context to
elucidate contemporary developments and to assess the present relationship.

RELATIONS THROUGH THE COLD WAR PERIOD
Following World War II and the establishment of the bipolar international system
that characterized the Cold War, the United States and Turkey had mutually
beneficial interests in mitigating the power of the Soviet Union. Turkey realized
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the threat posed by the burgeoning strength of its neighbor, especially after Stalin
demanded border realignment and unlimited access to the Turkish Straits.120 The
Cold War policy aimed at containing the Soviets led the United States to align
with a geo-strategically important Turkey. Through the Truman Doctrine of 1947
the United States provided military assistance to Greece and Turkey to support
resistance to the Soviet threat. By the late 1950s, relations “blossomed into an
extensive network of military, economic, and political relations that had the full
support of policy makers in both Washington and Ankara.”121 During this period,
the partnership was institutionalized with Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, a mutual defense agreement between the
United States, Canada, and ten western European states.
The first challenges to the US-Turkish alliance surfaced in the 1960s
concerning the island of Cyprus. While a sovereign nation since 1960, Cyprus had
a considerable Turkish minority in constant contention with the Greek majority.
The controversy resulted from a letter from US President Lyndon Johnson in
which he communicated that “NATO would not defend Turkey if the Soviet
Union attacked it during a Turkish intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriot
minority from the communal violence spearheaded by the Greek Cypriot
majority.”122 The infamous Johnson letter was, and continues to be, a source of
consternation in Turkey, contrasting the unwavering alliance that had previously
characterized relations. The letter increased mistrust of the United States and even
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anti-Americanism among some of the Turkish population.123 In 1974, Turkey
invaded Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. In response, the US
Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, and Turkey reciprocated by
suspending the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 terminating the activities
of all the American bases in the country with the exception of those that had a
purely NATO function.124This series of events represented a nadir in US-Turkish
relations. However, relations normalized with a lifting of the weapons embargo in
1978. Ensuing positive relations would be due to concerns about the “security and
regional stability implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the rise
of a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran in 1979.”125 By the time of the Gulf
War in the early 1990s, US-Turkish relations had returned to the status quo as
Turkey was again identified as an important ally in enabling the coalition victory
under US leadership.

POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS
From a realist perspective, the end of the Cold War produced a paradigm shift in
the international political system from a contentious bipolar system to a unipolar
system dominated by the United States. More recently, US hegemonic control is
increasingly tempered by regional coalitions like the European Union and even by
influential regional powers like South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, India and
Turkey. This realist perspective is one alternative explanation for understanding
post-Cold War developments. However, analyzing US-Turkish relations in this
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new global context using the constructivist approach yields the question of
whether each nation’s identities and interests converge enough to continue the
partnership. From the constructivist perspective, there is an inherent concern with
identity and how perceived self-identity affects interests and actions. Some recent
actions and policies by Turkey have highlighted fundamental disagreements in
policy considerations and perhaps an identity shift. In the post-Cold War period,
Turkey has further asserted an independent foreign policy in pursuit of its own
interests reflecting its hybrid identity, which has often not mirrored American
policy. These actions support the argument that Turkey is an emerging regional
power and is “no longer content to play the role of junior partner”126 in bilateral
relations with the United States. This argument is evidenced by Turkey’s actions
leading up to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 and Turkey’s current relations with
Iran and Israel.
One of the most surprising and conspicuous clashes in policy perspectives
came in the lead up to the war in Iraq in 2003. In planning for the invasion of Iraq,
the United States expected to utilize Turkish territory to open a second front in the
war. When asked for permission, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted to
disallow such an operation much to the surprise and chagrin of US
policymakers.127 In Washington, this signaled disloyalty and distrust from Turkey,
with residual effects. However, the decision of the Turkish Parliament must be
understood in context. The ruling AKP party was unwilling to “back yet another
US war against a Muslim country-especially when opinion polls indicated that
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more than 90 percent of the Turkish population opposed an attack on Iraq.”128
Allowing US troops to invade Iraq through Turkish territory would have set a
dangerous precedent that was unconscionable for Turkish policymakers. This
instance illustrated Turkey following a policy, which undermined US plans, but
was necessary for the assertion of Turkey’s interests to sustain its hybrid identity
as a modern Islamic democracy and a regional power.
Another recent issue of contention between the United States and Turkey
has been relations with Iran vis-à-vis its nuclear program. In its early years, the
Obama Administration sought to engage Iran diplomatically to resolve the nuclear
issue. However, diplomacy gave way to a more hardline position aimed at using
economic sanctions against Iran. Both “unilaterally and through the United
Nations,”129 the United States actively pursued sanctions as the most effective
method for crippling the Iranian nuclear program. Conversely, Turkey was
committed to diplomacy as the method for engaging its eastern neighbor. This
perspective “resulted in Turkey voting ‘no’ at the UN Security Council”130 for
increased sanctions in sharp opposition to US interests. The reason for this policy
disagreement may be that Turkey does not perceive a nuclear Iran to be as big a
threat as does the United States. Or, Turkey may have wanted to “avoid the rising
tensions they feared would result from additional sanctions”131 against its
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neighbor. The case of Iran exemplifies a definite divergence of opinion between
the United States and Turkey.
Furthermore, Turkey’s increasingly tense relations with Israel have
strained US-Turkish relations, given the special relationship between the United
States and Israel. While Turkey had previously been one of Israel’s few
supporters in the region, developments in the last few years have soured the
relationship. The ruling AKP party has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel,
while giving greater support to the Palestinian cause. This was the case in
“Ankara’s harsh criticism of the Israeli military offensive into Gaza in 2009.”132
Additionally, the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 was a source of
heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey. The incident unfolded as “Israeli
special forces attacked and boarded ships in a Turkish-led relief flotilla,
supposedly on a humanitarian mission to Gaza” which resulted in the killing of
several Turkish citizens.133 In addition to attracting international media attention,
this incident resulted in increasingly strained diplomatic relations between Turkey
and Israel. To some extent, the worsening Israeli-Turkish relationship can be
attributed to Turkey’s evolving identity as it embraces its Islamic identity. As a
result, Turkey feels greater solidarity with its Muslim brethren in Palestine, with
adverse effects for its relations with Israel.
Nevertheless, regarding Israel, both Turkey and the United States agree on
“a Jewish state with defined and recognized borders that can live side-by-side
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with a self-sustainable, viable, and demilitarized Palestinian state.”134 This
harmony in objectives is true of most policy considerations between the United
States and Turkey. While there are some major policy disagreements, as already
mentioned, minor differences should not undermine common goals.135 President
Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan both emphasize the continued strategic
partnership that exists between the United States and Turkey, underscoring the
continuity in relations between the two states.

CONCLUSION
Since World War II, the United States and Turkey have maintained strong
political, economic, and military relations, with only brief periods of contention.
Throughout the Cold War era, this relationship benefited both states in their
efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Also, Turkey benefited by growing its
economy, military power, and political influence. As a result, in the post-Cold
War period, Turkey was enabled to assert itself as a regional power. This
assertion of power involved undertaking independent foreign policy that
sometimes countered the interests of the United States. Turkey’s evolving selfidentification greatly contributed to these clashes in policy. As Turkey embraced
its enhanced economic and political influence and its Muslim identity, it acquired
a unique position as a Western ally with commitments and responsibilities in the
Muslim world. While this has led to continued disagreement on certain issues,
Turkey and the United States share common values, a commitment to secular
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republican democracy, and common political, military and economic interests that
maintain the strategic partnership.
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CHAPTER 7
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY

INTRODUCTION
The changing political dynamics of Eurasia necessitate a reexamination of the
strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States. Recent developments
have bolstered the influence of some states, strained US relations with former
partners, and diminished American authority in the region. This reduced
American role underscores the importance of strengthening relations with Turkey,
an emergent regional power, whose partnership is invaluable to advancing US
interests in the region. For the United States, Turkey is a precious resource for
issues concerning securing access to energy, military and security concerns,
encouragement of democratization in the Arab world, and support for the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. All of these issues are vital to US regional interests and both
countries could mutually benefit from strengthened ties.

THE CHANGING US ROLE IN THE REGION
According to Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, the Middle East has undergone
conspicuous changes in its balance of power over the last decade.136 There has
been an emergence of regional power-brokers, like Turkey and Iran, but also the
destabilization of formerly influential nations, like Iraq. These changing dynamics
are most pronounced with the developments of the Arab Spring and the ousting of
decades-old regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. These changes have
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implications for US relations with states in the region and for the amplification of
American power. Fradkin and Libby argue that American influence in the region
has weakened as “our ties have eroded with states that once supported much of
our agenda,”137 undermining American objectives and interests. As a nation that
previously exerted extensive influence in regional activities, the United States is
increasingly less able to “support friends, punish enemies, or achieve [its]
aims.”138
Islamic theologian Ibn Hazm famously stated that “if you treat your friend
and enemy the same, you will arouse distaste for your friendships and contempt
for your enemies, and you will not be long for this world.”139 Elements of US
foreign policy in the Middle East have demonstrated this very point. The
hypocrisy and lack of assertiveness that have characterized recent policies have
functioned to precipitate the diminishing of US influence in the region. In the
wake of the Arab Spring, US willingness to utilize military force in Libya to assist
domestic insurrection but ignore similar developments in Syria and Bahrain,
highlights an inconsistency in US policy that has served to undermine American
legitimacy.
The waning of American power underscores the value of strengthening the
partnership with Turkey, a resurgent regional player. The “prevailing securityheavy framework”140 that has historically characterized relations must be
realigned in light of changing dynamics. Recently, American interests in the
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region have centered on routing al-Qaeda and other agents of global terror,
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thwarting nuclear proliferation and
insuring access to energy.141 Turkey is “proximate to countries pivotal to
American foreign policy and national security”142 and has the political and
economic wherewithal to assist US objectives positively. Therefore, the
delineations of the partnership must reflect these changing realities. In effect, the
United States can neither belittle nor unilaterally force Turkey’s hand. The
rapprochement begun under the Obama administration must continue to fortify
relations in pursuit of mutually beneficial interests. Turkey and the United States
share an identity as secular democracies which should reinforce relations and
enable future cooperation.

US INTERESTS IN EURASIA AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY
I argue that to achieve its objectives in the region, the United States must better
utilize its strategic partnership with Turkey. On issues such as securing access to
energy resources, military and security concerns, encouraging democratization in
the Arab world, and supporting the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Turkey can serve as a beneficial regional partner. In terms of access to energy,
Turkey is located on “critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black
Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles), channels for trade
and the flow of energy to global markets.”143 Additionally, the enormously
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important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has its terminus at the Turkish
Mediterranean city of Ceyhan. Petroleum from this pipeline supplies energy to
several Central Asian nations and is “essential to American efforts to reduce the
dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on
Russia’s energy pipelines.”144 In essence, Turkey’s geographical location makes it
a vital part of enabling the supply of energy to the global market. And, the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline functions to moderate the potential regional influence that
could be wielded by Russia because of its vast energy supplies, for the benefit of
broader US regional interests.
Further, Menon and Wimbush argue that decades of military cooperation
have helped to solidify Turkey’s position as an essential NATO member with farreaching benefits for American military missions in the region. As a member of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Turkey has been involved in
the stabilization and development of Afghanistan.145 Military bases throughout
Turkey- in Incirlik, Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Mus- support NATO as
well as US missions in the region.146 In the war against Iraq, the United States
was able to use Turkish airspace for its aircrafts and Turkey provided vital
“logistical support to US forces in Iraq.”147 Reciprocally, the United States aids
Turkey in its struggle against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency.
US economic and military assistance supports Turkey in its fight against the
northern Iraq based militants. The United States categorizes “the PKK as a
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terrorist organization and continually emphasizes its commitment to defeating all
terrorists in Iraq.”148 These long-standing military ties, while part of a variety of
strategic interests, are mutually beneficial and should be persistently cultivated.
Furthermore, Turkey, in its role as a mediator, can serve as a partner in the
proliferation of peace and democracy in the region, most notably with the
developments of the Arab Spring and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The recent wave of democratization sweeping the Arab world has
enabled the emergence of free speech and human rights in previously
authoritarian nations. With the American emphasis on personal freedom and
democratic institutions, the events of the Arab Spring signal progressive change
for the Middle East. However, the process of democratizing, as evidenced by
Turkey, can be difficult and protracted. While the United States cannot
unilaterally impose democratic institutions on Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, it can
utilize Turkey’s status as a regional power and an Islamic democracy. Already,
Turkey has taken an active role in working with the Arab League to resolve the
crisis in Syria and can extend that role to assisting the democratizing Arab Spring
nations.
While Turkey should not necessarily be shown as a model Muslim
democracy, the democratizing process in Turkey can be instructive for nascent
regimes across the Arab world. Additionally, Turkey can serve a significant role
in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an issue of grave importance to the
United States. The special relationship between the United States and Israel is the
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source of wide-spread consternation and anti-Americanism across the region.
However, as a Muslim nation with former close ties to Israel and growing
sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Turkey can and is willing to exert its regional
power and play the role of peacemaker. In fact, Turkey has “offered its good
offices to begin a dialogue between Hamas and Israel”149, a potentially substantial
development given the current impasse. As Joshua Walker asserts, the importance
of Turkey for US regional interests cannot be overstated.150 Turkey is an essential
component in the US pursuit of military collaboration, access to energy, and
furthering peace and democracy in the region. Therefore, “a reinvigorated
strategic partnership is possible, and will be in the interest of both countries. But it
is likely to have quite different contours, with new forms of engagement-and
more realistic expectations.”151
President Obama highlighted the strategic importance of Turkey in a
speech to the Turkish Parliament in 2009. While identifying Turkey as a “critical
ally,” President Obama recognized the recent strained relations by emphasizing
the need to “build on our mutual interests and rise above our differences.”152
Going forward, the President proposed that the partnership be centered around
recognition of a long historical alliance, the importance of Turkey in the ”EastWest corridor for oil and natural gas,” and a united fight in the war against
terror.153 In this speech, and through the course of the administration, President
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Obama has shown a willingness to further engage with Turkey to ameliorate
relations by emphasizing points of convergence. Efforts to support “renewable
energy investment in Turkey” or intensified attacks on al Qaeda and the PKK
should characterize bilateral relations.154 The Obama administration recognizes
Turkey’s emergent role in the region and acknowledges that there will sometimes
be divergence in national interests due to conflicting identities. Increasingly,
Turkey hybrid identity as a Western ally and a leading Muslim nation is becoming
more apparent and problematic. The United States must respect Turkey’s hybrid
identity and be cognizant of conflicting interests. Therefore, the strengthening of
bilateral relations will be facilitated by pursuing objectives that are mutually
beneficial.

CONCLUSION
For decades, the United States has had strategic interests in Eurasia. These
interests are as important as ever, highlighting the importance of maintaining and
strengthening relations with the US’s regional partner, Turkey. Over time,
developments in the region have reduced American power while inversely
affirming Turkey’s position as a regional power. Also, the United States has
significant regional interests concerning access to energy resources, military and
security concerns, supporting the emerging democracies of the Arab Spring, and
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given Turkey’s important position in the
region and its ability to assist in all of these areas, the United States must
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strengthen ties with Turkey for sake of maintaining strategic interests in the
region.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to make two general arguments. First, I argue
that Turkey has emerged as a regional power, which has been enabled by
numerous factors that have reinforced one another. Second, that Turkey’s
emergence as a regional power has implications for US-Turkish bilateral relations
and for American interests in Eurasia. In proving the first argument, the paper
analysis Turkey’s foundational history and shows how the nation-building project
under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk enabled the establishment of unique foundational
principles that eventually allowed Turkey’s emergence. Then, the paper examines
the process of democratization in Turkey. Through decades of democratizing,
Turkey has developed a viable Muslim democracy, albeit imperfect, that has
legitimized Turkey politically and presented it as a regional player. Additionally,
the paper evaluates certain economic and political policies undertaken by Turkey
in the last three decades. By instituting a neo-liberal economic model, Turkey
attracted foreign investment and integrated into the regional market. Also, through
a more aggressive foreign policy and rapprochement with neighboring nations,
Turkey has established itself as an economic and political regional power.
Furthermore, the paper examines the process of Europeanization in Turkey. In
essence, through economic integration with Europe and the reforms induced by
the EU accession process, Turkey has further legitimized its regional role.
In proving the second argument, the paper begins with a brief overview of
the history of US-Turkish bilateral relations and shows that it has been
characterized by a military, political and economic alliance and shared identities
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as secular democracies. However, the paper reveals major points of contention
between American and Turkish policy, namely the US-led war in Iraq and
Turkish relations with Iran and Syria. Because Turkey pursued policy objectives
that countered the US position, there was a resultant strain on relations which
served to undermine the partnership. There is an analysis of the changing regional
political dynamics and its implications for US objectives. Given US interests in
the region and a common identity with Turkey as secular democracies, the paper
argues for strengthened bilateral relations for the benefit of mutual interests.
In making these arguments, the paper also serves to elucidate certain
global developments. For one, Turkey is emblematic of a changing global
political system in which certain nations are accruing larger regional significance.
Apart from Turkey, this trend is evident in South Korea, Brazil, India, among
others. Additionally, these emergent regional powers are mitigating the influence
of larger nations like the United States, which has unavoidable implications for
the formation and implementation of American foreign policy. In essence, US
foreign policy can no longer be unilateral in nature, but must further harmonize
with regional partners for the realization of American objectives.
To some extent, the notion of Turkey as an emergent regional power is a
self-conceived identity. Through the international relations theory of
constructivism which argues that “how actors define their ‘selves’ . . . informs
their ‘interests’”155 and actions, Turkey is identifying itself as an important
regional player and promulgating that image. However, I assert that the enhanced
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economic and political importance of Turkey justifies this self-conceived identity
and that Turkey is an emergent power. Even among the Turkish polity, there is a
general acceptance of the nation’s regional role evidenced by a poll showing that
62% of Turks have confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign policy.156
Similarly, polls show that throughout the region there is approval of Turkey’s
burgeoning role with 78% of Egyptians and 72% of Jordanians supporting
Erdogan’s policies. Furthermore, I assert that there is growing recognition
outside of the region, specifically from the United States, of Turkey’s importance.
Essentially, US policymakers are increasing cognizant of Turkey’s significance
for American objectives in Eurasia and I argue for strengthened bilateral relation
to realize US and Turkish interests in the region.
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Summary of Capstone Project
The purpose of this project is to show the increasing political and economic
importance of Turkey in Eurasia. The paper argues that Turkey has emerged as a
regional power in Eurasia and that this emergence has implications for USTurkish relations. In effect, the United States and Turkey share a common identity
as secular republican democracies and common political, military and economic
interests and must strengthen their partnership for mutually beneficial interests in
the region.
The first part of the paper analyzes the notion of Turkey as a regional
power. By using the term regional power, the implication is that Turkey has
acquired political and economic influence in the region that has enhanced its
importance. While Turkey cannot drastically impact global developments, the
paper emphasizes the importance of Turkey in Eurasia. The purpose of this part is
to explain what accounts for Turkey’s emergence as a regional power, essentially
what steps led to Turkey’s current position as a politically and economically
important state. The paper proposes that four factors led to Turkey’s emergence as
a regional power: the principles that founded the nation, the role of democracy in
Turkey’s development, economic and political policies over the last three
decades, and Turkey’s interaction with the European Union. All of these factors
are presented as working collectively to enable Turkey’s eventual emergence as a
regional power.
The second part of the paper makes a connection between Turkey’s
emergence as a regional power and its implications for relations between Turkey
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and the United States. There is an overview of the history of US-Turkish relations
to show the depth of friendship based on a common democratic identity and a
military, political, and economic alliance. Also, the paper shows that the United
States has certain strategic interests in the region, namely, securing access to
energy, maintaining a military presence and containing security threats,
supporting democracy in the Arab world and advocating for a peaceful resolution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the last decade, however, there have been
tense relations between the United States and Turkey because of disagreements on
certain issues. Overall, the paper argues that given US interests in the region and a
common identity with Turkey as secular democracies, the United States and
Turkey must strengthen bilateral relations for the benefit of mutual interests.
Throughout the paper, the international relations theory of constructivism
is used to show the evolving identity, interests, and actions of Turkey.
Constructivism argues that the interests and policies of a state are reliant upon the
state’s self-identity. For example, because Turkey identifies as a part of the West
it has attempted to institute a form of democracy acceptable to western states.
Also, because Turkey self identifies as a leader in the Islamic world it has sought
better relations with all of its neighboring Muslim nations. Throughout the paper,
constructivism is used as a lens for understanding the perceptions and actions of
Turkey and the United States.
The method for conducting this research involved consultation of journal
articles, news media sources, books, interviews, speeches, and relevant blogs.
Also, the author was privileged to spend time conducting empirical research in
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Turkey. First, the author interned for an organization that advocates strengthened
relations between the United States and Turkey. Second, by taking university
courses in Istanbul the author was able to gain an understanding of the Turkish
perspective. Additionally, consultation with faculty, both in Istanbul and
Syracuse, enabled the author to engage with the literature at great length. As a
result, the paper serves to inform the reader about Turkey’s importance and also
function as advocacy for modified US foreign policy towards Turkey.

